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The State and Civil Society
in Disaster Response:
Post-Tsunami Experiences in Tamil Nadu
Krithika Srinivasan
Vijay K. Nagaraj
SUMMARY. This paper, based on the report “The State and Civil Soci-
ety in Disaster Response: An Analysis of the Tamil Nadu Tsunami Ex-
perience,” (Srinivasan, Nagaraj, & Venkatesh, 2005) is essentially an
empirical analysis of state and civil society responses in Tamil Nadu (In-
dia) to the tsunami of December 26, 2004. It examines interventions by
state and non-state agencies, as well as people’s experiences in the relief
and rehabilitation phases to identify factors influencing both positive
and negative outcomes of the tsunami response. Issues related to vulner-
ability and exclusion, equity, transparency and accountability in differ-
ent sectors of disaster intervention are explored to highlight themes
revolving around reach and efficacy of relief and recovery processes.
These analyses bring out some interesting lessons with regard to the im-
portance of institutional autonomy, non-politicized decision-making,
and synergetic state-civil society interfaces in fostering inclusive, trans-
parent and accountable rehabilitation processes. The roles played by in-
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stitutional responsiveness and flexibility in shaping an effective disaster
response also emerge very clearly from this study of the Tamil Nadu ex-
perience. Another crucial finding points to the need for detailed, reliable
and disaggregated geo-demographic and socioeconomic records as a re-
source base for informing relief and rehabilitation interventions. The
study draws extensively from the experiences and insights of people af-
fected by, and involved in tsunami response, and from secondary knowl-
edge resources available on the disaster. doi:10.1300/J198v05n03_04 [Ar-
ticle copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Service:
1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address: <docdelivery@haworthpress.com> Web-
site: <http://www.HaworthPress.com> © 2006 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All
rights reserved.]
KEYWORDS. Tamil Nadu, tsunami, civil society response, state re-
sponse, accountability, participation information
It was a devastating earthquake off the coast of Sumatra in the Indo-
nesian archipelago, of magnitude 9.0 on the Richter Scale, followed by
one of magnitude 7.3 on the Richter Scale 81 kilometers off Pulo Kunji,
Great Nicobar, India, that resulted in massive tsunamis in several coun-
tries in South Asia and East Africa–Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thai-
land, Somalia, Myanmar, Maldives, Malaysia, Tanzania, Bangladesh,
Kenya and Seychelles.
In India, the tsunami affected nearly 2,260 kilometers of the main-
land coastline (Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Pondicherry),
as well as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, with tidal waves up to 10
meters high penetrating up to 3 kilometers inland, taking at least 10,749
lives (Government of India, 2005) and affecting more than 2.79 million
people across 1,089 villages.
In Tamil Nadu, the worst affected state on the mainland, over 8,010
deaths were reported. Thirteen districts were hit by the tsunami, of
which Nagapattinam, Kanyakumari, and Cuddalore were the worst af-
fected, with a death toll of 6,065,828, and 617, respectively. In all, ac-
cording to the GoTN (Government of Tamil Nadu), 984,564 people
were affected with over 8,000 deaths and 126,182 homes being dam-
aged or destroyed. In addition, more than 3,400 people were reported
missing (“Tsunami–The Killer waves,” 2005).
In Tamil Nadu, one thousand kilometers (kms) of the coastline were
affected, with water penetrating up to 1-1.5 kms inland and causing ex-
tensive damage to nearly 19,168 hectares of cropped area (damage fig-
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ures, however, have been constantly evolving). In addition, Tamil Nadu
also suffered substantial losses in terms of loss of livelihoods–loss of
assets such as boats and other fishery related assets, loss of livestock,
disruption of the fisheries sector, traditional market links and other live-
lihoods linked to the coastal economy, and damage to other resources
such as pasture and grazing lands. The tsunami also caused extensive
damage to social infrastructure, community assets, harbors, and trans-
port, power and communication infrastructure.
This paper is based on a study conducted in four tsunami affected
districts of Tamil Nadu–Chennai, Kanyakumari, Nagapattinam and
Cuddalore–nearly a year after the tsunami. The primary objective of the
study, and of this paper, is to analyze and bring together the experiences
and learnings of a range of actors affected by, and involved in, the disas-
ter response in order to identify factors that influence effectiveness and
reach of the relief and rehabilitation processes. These analyses include
examinations of the state and civil society responses, key issues relating
to the relief and rehabilitation processes, and transparency and account-
ability concerns. The paper relies on fieldwork, discussions with key ac-
tors in the tsunami response, and also draws from the wealth of material
available from various agencies on the tsunami.
THE STATE RESPONSE
At the very outset, it is important to stress that, as a phenomenon, the
tsunami was one that was beyond the pale of experience of the State ap-
paratus. Despite an initial paralysis due to the nature and sheer scale of
the disaster, compounded by the breakdown of communications chan-
nels, the State and District level administrations (the latter is headed by
the District Collector and Magistrate, a senior officer of the Indian Ad-
ministrative Services) swung into action by noon 26 December 2004,
with the first government orders (GOs) regarding relief and rehabilita-
tion packages being issued on the 28th December 2004.
Bringing in the Armed Forces for search and rescue operations, and
moving on to organize relief camps and announce ex-gratia payments
for loss of life and injury, the government, in the relief phase, is to be
noted for averting a large-scale public health crisis despite thousands
being housed in relief camps, and extensive destruction of essential in-
frastructure. In the rehabilitation phase, the State’s efforts have largely
focused on housing and livelihood rehabilitation, with a massive recon-
struction program well underway. Requirements of vulnerable groups
Krithika Srinivasan and Vijay K. Nagaraj 59
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such as children, destitute individuals and women have also been ad-
dressed to an extent through measures such as school fee waivers, spe-
cial deposits, pensions, etc.
Critical Institutional Factors
To enhance the response capacity of the administration, a number of
carefully chosen personnel from various departments across the State
were put in place at various levels and also given considerable deci-
sion-making powers. In Nagapattinam, the worst affected district, 11
teams, each comprising one Indian Administrative Services (IAS) offi-
cer, senior officials from departments such as Health, Agriculture, and
Public Works, and headed by a Minister of the State Government, were
formed to assess damages, coordinate relief processes, and distribute
ex-gratia in specific village clusters. Such teams, working on similar
lines, were formed in other districts as well. These teams, which were in
place for a month, were given administrative and financial powers to
enable quick response to the situation on the ground. They also estab-
lished linkages with civil society responders and, in all, have been
recognized for the vital role they played in ensuring effective relief
processes.
Across the state, postings of senior officers to the affected districts
were executed rapidly, with personnel being chosen for their compe-
tency, commitment, integrity, and familiarity with local conditions
and affected communities. The State Government promptly devolved
financial and administrative powers, with District Collectors being au-
thorized to draw up to 10 million rupees to deal with a range of imme-
diate requirements according to their discretion. The administrative
and financial devolution was extended to lower levels also (such as of-
ficers responsible for relief camps), facilitating rapid and locally
adapted decision-making. Further, while political representatives did
accompany relief teams, there seem to have been clear guidelines is-
sued from the top (the State Government) that led to minimal political
interference in the relief process that was largely driven by the admin-
istration. It is stressed by many observers that the key to a strong insti-
tutional response after the initial paralysis lay in the above conditions
being met.
This level of administrative autonomy and lack of political inter-
ference has continued even through the rehabilitation phase, and
coupled with an efficient and less bureaucratic leadership hand-
picked to lead the tsunami response, is said to have made GoTN’s
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response, despite several shortcomings, more effective as com-
pared to other states, and according to one observer, even some
other countries. Further, the Tamil Nadu experience shows that an
efficient administration empowered with sufficient autonomy can
actually compensate for shortcomings in the policy framework.
Given the fact that policy frameworks are not always consistent
with local conditions, district administrations have been very flexi-
ble in allowing necessary adaptations in implementation of rehabil-
itation programs. A case in point is the reconstruction of houses
within the 200m CRZ zone in Kanyakumari (see section on housing
rehabilitation). It is also recognized that it was a clear message
from the strong political leadership recognizing the importance of
autonomy and protecting the administration from political interfer-
ence that was crucial in fostering this facilitative environment.
These institutional factors have translated into a high degree of gov-
ernment responsiveness to the situation on the ground. The administra-
tion has been extremely proactive in engaging with civil society in
terms of partnering with a range of non-government agencies in the re-
lief and rehabilitation processes, as well as in being extremely receptive
to feedback regarding policy frameworks and efficacy of rehabilitation
processes. Coordination mechanisms have been set up for liaison with
civil society, and bureaucratic procedures cut down drastically. This re-
sponsiveness has also meant an enhanced people-administration inter-
face: (a) group discussions in affected communities conducted by
Collectors in the initial days; (b) regular field visits; (c) weekly griev-
ance days; and (d) officers specially designated to handle particular as-
pects of relief and reconstruction to enable a disaggregated response to
grievances; these officers’ contact details are made public through the
local media, etc.
It must be noted here that elected village panchayats (constitution-
ally recognized local self-governing bodies at the village level) have
not been really visible and central in the response efforts. It is believed
by many observers that these elected bodies have been bypassed, al-
beit quietly, in an attempt to keep the relief and rehabilitation process
in the hands of the administration rather than vest it in elected, i.e., po-
litical bodies, and thus minimize the chances of politicizing the relief
and reconstruction process. However, this move has been much ques-
tioned and debated on the grounds that these are democratic bodies,
perhaps the best suited to implement an equitable rehabilitation pro-
cess.
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CIVIL SOCIETY RESPONSES
In the wake of the tsunami, civil society, in India and abroad, rose to
the occasion, with communities, individuals, bilateral donor agencies,
international, national and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
academic institutions, political groups, the media, religious trusts, inter-
est groups with membership bases in the affected communities, and the
corporate sector mobilizing to respond to the needs of the tsunami-af-
fected areas.
To begin with, the general public and civil society organizations
brought in with them substantial amounts of resources and expertise to
help provide immediate relief to the affected people, and were engaged
in a whole spectrum of activities–rescue, retrieval and disposal of bod-
ies and debris, provision of food and essential medical care, construc-
tion of temporary shelters, psychosocial interventions, setting up relief
camps, etc. One of the major contributions of the civil society organiza-
tions has been their ability to fill crucial gaps at the time of relief and
rescue. For instance, while the government could mobilize large quanti-
ties of food-grain, it was civil society organizations that were able to
mobilize essentials such as children’s clothing, underwear, sanitary
pads and baby food.
Civil society engagement in tsunami response has continued into the
rehabilitation phase, with non-government agencies extensively in-
volved in not only planning, resourcing and implementing rehabilita-
tion programs, but also in influencing state policy to shape it in a
manner that addresses people’s real needs. For instance, it was civil so-
ciety that was instrumental in bringing to the government’s attention
that coastal communities comprised not only fish workers, but also a
range of other groups involved in diverse occupations, which had all
been affected in various ways by the tsunami.
Civil society organizations have been proactive in highlighting the
specific and precise needs of communities through intervention, re-
search and documentation, bringing to light instances of exclusion, and
in advocating for the rights of vulnerable groups such as Dalits (literally
meaning “broken people”; Dalit, like Black, is a political identity of a
section of people formerly referred to as “untouchables” or “outcastes,”
i.e., those outside the “Caste” Hindu society), non-fish workers, women
and the aged. They also have played crucial roles in giving feedback to
the administration regarding shortcomings and malpractice in various
rehabilitation processes, and in bringing to the government’s attention
any negative implications of state policies–for instance, older men were
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marrying minor orphaned girls for the special deposits made in their
name by the government as a part of tsunami rehabilitation. At this junc-
ture, it must be noted that the government, in general, has been proac-
tive in taking corrective measures and passing the necessary directives.
In addition to organizations directly involved in the relief and recon-
struction work, there are also a number of groups and collectives that fo-
cus entirely on independent analysis of policy and practice, using the
media, the courts, and mobilizing affected people and communities to
highlight key issues of concern. Given their non-involvement in the ac-
tual administration of relief and rehabilitation, they often act as watch-
dogs trying to examine the situation from wider perspectives that dis-
tance can often bring, but are, of course, unable to always appreciate the
challenges faced while actually trying to implement policy or opera-
tionalize standards and plans.
THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY:
INTERFACES, SYNERGIES, AND CONFLICTS
The response to the tsunami has seen an extraordinary level of syn-
ergy between various actors–government and non-government. It can
be stressed that coordination, dialogue and information sharing between
civil society organizations and the government have gone a long way in
enhancing the effectiveness and reach of the response.
Right from the beginning, the administration was open to working in
tandem with a range of civil society groups. This was seen during the re-
lief phase, with the specially appointed teams regularly meeting, and
proactively welcoming feedback from civil society groups. In addition,
the administration also played a crucial role in coordinating interven-
tions by NGOs to avoid duplication, and often sought their (NGOs) help
in filling gaps in the government response. Such close engagement has
continued through the response processes, with civil society working
closely with the state in direct interventions, as well as in providing pol-
icy related feedback and input. The government, on its part, has been
extremely responsive to civil society’s concerns, as is visible in the con-
stant evolution of tsunami GOs based on field information from various
civil society sources, including the media.
The entire state-civil society interface appears to be built around two
key principles adopted by the government:
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a. Accessibility–The highest levels of the administration at the Dis-
trict and State levels were very willing to meet, listen to and pay
attention to the issues and concerns raised by civil society, as well
as accept several of their recommendations.
b. Inclusiveness–The government has worked actively to create
spaces and mechanisms for civil society organizations to partici-
pate effectively.
The Public-Private Partnership Framework
One such mechanism is the public-private partnership framework
adopted by the government for the rehabilitation process. Under this
framework, civil society organizations were invited to invest in and
partner with the government in livelihood rehabilitation, and housing
and infrastructure reconstruction.
This partnership has been widely adopted especially for housing re-
construction–government is responsible for providing land and basic
infrastructure, while civil society organizations are to provide resources
for, and undertake the actual construction process. State policy also lays
down minimum standards for disaster resistant housing, guidelines re-
lating to community participation, insurance, monitoring and third
party auditing. If, for a particular habitation, no civil society organiza-
tion comes through to undertake construction, then the affected people
themselves would be permitted to do so with financial and technical as-
sistance from the state. The government is to undertake construction
only in cases in which both NGOs and beneficiaries are not forthcom-
ing. In the urban areas of Chennai and Thiruvallur, however, all recon-
struction is being undertaken by the government.
Coordination Forums
Coordination mechanisms have been established at the District level
(and at the State level at a later stage) to better leverage the expertise of
civil society and optimize the use of resources. Coordination bodies
(such as the Kanyakumari Rehabilitation Resource Centre, NGO Coor-
dination and Resource Centre [NCRC] in Nagapattinam, and the
Chennai NGOs Coordination Cell) that bring together a wide range of
civil society organizations and the administration were set up by the
joint initiative of certain NGOs and the Collectorate. In other districts,
too, coordination meetings are organized regularly.
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The single most important feature of these coordination bodies is that
they have a strong working relationship with the administration. They
help ensure a constant interface between the administration and civil so-
ciety groups (and between civil society groups themselves), and usually
have the following objectives:
a. Coordinating rehabilitation efforts by civil society organizations
and the government to maximize potentials and avoid duplication;
b. Sharing knowledge, perspectives, information and expertise;
c. Discussing rehabilitation issues and giving feedback to the gov-
ernment.
Effective coordination is not just a felt need of the civil society organiza-
tions involved, but also greatly assists the administration in ensuring more
effective resource allocation and planning, and has the potential to greatly
reduce duplication and wastage of resources. A very interesting aspect of
the experience of the district level coordination mechanisms is the role
played by the District Collector in shaping civil society interventions
through these forums. If the experience in Tamil Nadu is any indication, for
such coordination mechanisms to be effective, key personnel such as the
District Collector must have sufficient knowledge of and understanding re-
garding the work and dynamics of civil society organizations as well as
possess good facilitation and coordination skills.
One of the criticisms leveled at the coordination and interface forums
is that they are democratic only in name and, in effect are controlled by
the administration. It is pointed out that these coordination bodies have
largely restricted themselves to logistical issues, and have not served as
forums where substantive and policy impacting discussions occur. It is
also pointed out that the presence of these coordination bodies has not
enhanced the overall transparency of either the government or non-gov-
ernment agencies. However, given their role in facilitating better com-
munication and maximizing potentials, there is clearly a need for these
mechanisms not only to continue, but also become stronger, as well as
expand the scope of their functioning to include transparency and ac-
countability related concerns.
Coordination and advocacy networks of a different nature can also be
found in Tamil Nadu. The Tsunami Relief and Rehabilitation Coordina-
tion (TRRC) is a forum that brings together a large number of local
NGOs, social movements and affected peoples’ organizations from
across Tamil Nadu, mostly with a focus on strengthening advocacy and
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coordinating efforts to influence policy and practice in the relief, recon-
struction and rehabilitation process. The TRRC focuses its efforts on
mobilizing affected communities to ensure effective rights-based reha-
bilitation and development. Some of the organizations affiliated with
the TRRC are also involved in the implementation of housing and liveli-
hood rehabilitation. The TRRC also engages in policy overview, look-
ing at relevance and standards, as well as transparent and democratic
functioning of both government and non-government agencies.
Civil Society Interventions: Conflicts and Debates
The extent of networking and synergy visible between state and
non-state actors in the tsunami response is not equally visible when it
comes to relationships between various civil society actors. Given the
diversity in institutional natures, orientation and perspectives, and the
extent of financial, human and technical resources available, coordina-
tion across the spectrum of civil society organizations has posed several
challenges.
At one end of the spectrum are organizations that invest heavily and
are intensely involved in rehabilitation-related work, typically sharing a
strong working relationship with the government, and often being affili-
ated with coordination cells such as the NCRC. At the other end of the
spectrum are coordination cells like the TRRC, which pursue an activist
agenda and have taken on a monitoring role, often not hesitating to
openly criticize the work of the government as well as some of the
larger agencies, development organizations and INGOs engaged in re-
lief and rehabilitation work.
Conversations with INGOs and the larger development organiza-
tions clearly reveal that many of them view the TRRC and many of the
associated organizations as “confrontationist” and difficult to work
with, and that they perceive themselves as more “constructive” in their
approach than those associated with the TRRC.
On the other hand, there seems to be a perception that coordination
cells such as the NCRC are “pro-government” rather than pro-people,
and that they are often coopted by the government. Apparently their in-
vestments and involvement in the rehabilitation processes create the
need to maintain smooth relations with the government, and therefore,
they refrain from taking up controversial issues that could antagonize
the administration. While at the one hand this could indeed be true, peo-
ple associated with these coordination cells point out that this percep-
tion probably stems from the fact that they, having direct access to the
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upper echelons of the administration, do not usually need to make a hue
and cry about their stand, or take it to the media.
Despite the vast differences among them, these apparently conflicting
networks of organizations are actually complementary to each other–in
any rehabilitation process, both activist organizations and development
organizations have roles to play. Despite this truism, efforts to get the
two ends of the spectrum to work together have been rather futile, with
diverse kinds of civil society organizations arrayed along various axes
rather than forming a loop that feeds into and complements each other’s
work.
Coordination between various organizations involved in direct reha-
bilitation has also been lacking, largely due to issues related to competi-
tion, and an unwillingness to share information. These conflicts and
difficulties in coordinating interventions have had negative implica-
tions in terms of accountability to people and an undermining of
response efforts, and pose a challenge that needs to be addressed on a pri-
ority basis.
POST-TSUNAMI RELIEF AND REHABILITATION:
KEY AREAS OF CONCERN
The tsunami left in its wake unprecedented destruction of life and re-
sources and posed a huge challenge to the State and civil society, both of
which have demonstrated a positive intent as well as informed and decisive
action. A synergy of their mutual strengths has been an important factor in
ensuring the development of a meaningful and strategic response. While
response efforts in Tamil Nadu have been by and large recognized as hav-
ing been comparatively effective and successful, it remains a fact that there
are several issues related to the relief and rehabilitation processes that are a
cause for concern, and that need to be critically delved into as an initial step
towards drawing vital lessons that can be taken forward to other disaster
situations.
Immediate Response and Relief
The relief phase saw the government, NGOs, local public bodies, re-
ligious groups, hospitals, etc., launch an intensive effort to rescue peo-
ple, retrieve and cremate or bury bodies, clear debris, transport people
to relief camps, organize medical facilities, make arrangements for
food, water and sanitation, and extend psychosocial care. The Armed
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Forces were brought in for search and rescue operations, and special
measures were taken to avoid epidemiological crises.
While on the whole relief activities are recognized as having been ef-
fectively coordinated, there were critical gaps and problems associated
with the organization and provision of relief. In the initial days, relief
was given only to those registered as tsunami affected, and people who
had fled their homes post-tsunami, returning after a few days, had con-
siderable difficulty in registering themselves. Further, at the start, aid
reached only fish worker communities, while several other communi-
ties who had lost their means of livelihood, but perhaps not property and
life, were overlooked completely. There were reports that in many vil-
lages, even if aid was distributed equally to all, it was usually collected
back later, and distributed only to those who lost assets like boats and
catamarans (Sampath, 2005). Relief supplies often did not reach vil-
lages that were situated at a distance from the main road. There was also
a fair amount of duplication of work and dumping of relief material due
to uncoordinated relief distribution by a plethora of agencies. Needs of
vulnerable groups such as women, children and the aged were typically
overlooked in relief camps.
While initially schools, colleges, marriage halls, etc., functioned as
relief camps, people were soon moved out to temporary shelters. With
regard to temporary shelters, haste to complete construction by the 15th
January, 2005, appears to have undone an otherwise well-framed pol-
icy. Typically, temporary shelters were very hot, poorly ventilated, had
no flooring, inadequate water and sanitation facilities, and insufficient
lighting. The shelters were built mostly in low-lying areas, and were
flooded during the monsoons in 2005. A year after the disaster, many
families continue to reside in these shelters, and are likely to do so for at
least another three to six months. While some civil society organiza-
tions have been involved in upgrading the quality and facilities of these
shelters, the overall experience has been one in which even widely
known standards such as the Sphere standards have not been adhered to.
Rehabilitation–Housing Reconstruction and Livelihood Recovery
1. Housing Rehabilitation: The Relocation Conundrum
Housing reconstruction is being implemented in partnership with
civil society organizations in all affected districts, except Chennai and
Thiruvallur. The housing rehabilitation policy initially brought out en-
visaged the permanent relocation of affected communities in order to
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incorporate safety considerations, and in keeping with the Coastal Reg-
ulation Zone (CRZ), notification (the CRZ Notification, issued in 1991
under the Environment Protection Act, 1986, regulates the types of ac-
tivities and land uses permitted in the coastal regulation zone. The noti-
fication, however, allows for fish workers settlements and associated
activities in these zones).
In the face of strong opposition from civil society on the grounds that
relocation would have a direct, negative impact on fishing livelihoods, a
new GO was issued making relocation optional for people residing
within 500 meters of the high tide line. However, people residing within
200 meters of the high tide line would not receive any government assis-
tance for repair/reconstruction unless they relinquished the site and
house, in return for a new house beyond the 200 meters zone.
The housing rehabilitation policy is evidently attempting to address
several concerns, often conflicting, ranging from livelihoods and safety,
to environmental and legal considerations. However, the fact that the
policy excludes people living within the 200-meter zone, a section of
the affected population that is extremely vulnerable given its proximity
to the sea, is a matter of concern. The State would have done well,
rather, to adopt a policy that allows partnership with the people and civil
society organizations to create disaster resistant housing for such vul-
nerable populations.
2. Housing Rehabilitation: Procedural Complications, Quality
and Community Participation
Acquiring land for resettlement of communities, despite a special di-
rective permitting district administrations to acquire land through private
negotiation, has been very difficult given the scarcity of land and high
land prices on the coast. Difficulties in land acquisition have led to delays
in allocation of habitations (for reconstruction) to NGOs, and the accom-
panying compulsion for people to stay for a prolonged period in the tem-
porary shelters. To circumvent this, district administrations have been
informally encouraging communities to opt for in situ rehabilitation, even
within the 200 meters zone.
Quality of construction has been another issue of concern, particu-
larly when the implementing agency hands over construction to a build-
ing contractor and removes itself from the scene, leaving room for
malpractice. The government’s stand that it will not provide assistance
for reconstruction within 200 meters of the high tide line is especially
problematic in light of quality concerns, as this implies that there are no
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technical guidelines, and allocation and monitoring mechanisms gov-
erning reconstruction here. When it comes to site selection, criteria re-
garding distance from sea and elevation are often not followed, and
quality of land is at times not acceptable–for instance, wetlands and
saltpan lands have been allocated in some areas. In totality, inadequate
monitoring and the lack of political will to enforce minimum standards
have impacted housing reconstruction negatively.
Participation of the affected community typically remains at a mini-
mum, despite the policy recommending early allocation and linking of
sites with beneficiaries to allow them to be a part of the process right
from the start. Consultation processes for design, layout planning, etc.,
are not always followed, or involve only power centers in the commu-
nity. The housing policy also favors external organization involvement
over owner-driven housing rehabilitation (the rehabilitation experience
after the Gujarat Earthquake of January 26, 2001, shows that owner-
driven housing, with financial and technical support from, and monitor-
ing by the State, is often the best option for rehabilitation in terms of re-
sulting in sustainable habitations that are in keeping with people’s
needs). Further, the ownership of the land remains with the State Gov-
ernment, with the district administration reserving the right to transfer
ownership to the beneficiaries as and when it deems fit.
3. Livelihoods
A range of livelihoods across the Tamil Nadu coast was affected by
the tsunami. While fishery-based livelihoods were the first to be recog-
nized as requiring rehabilitation assistance, it soon became apparent
that a large percentage of people on the coast dependent on other liveli-
hoods, particularly agriculture and informal sector occupations, were
affected as well.
Despite this recognition, rehabilitation of fishery-based livelihoods
(this discussion on rehabilitation of fishery-based livelihoods draws ex-
tensively from policy notes released by the NCRC, Nagapattinam) has
continued to receive the maximum attention from both the State and
civil society organizations. The focus in this sector has been on replace-
ment of assets, i.e., provision of boats and fishing equipment. The com-
bined and, at times, uncoordinated efforts of the State and civil society
to supply boats to fish workers has led to an increase in the total stock of
fishing boats in Tamil Nadu, with possible long-term, negative conse-
quences for fishery in Tamil Nadu which had already been experiencing
stagnation due to over-exploitation. This over-supply, often driven by
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the desire of civil society organizations to foster equity by giving boats
to those who were earlier laborers, has also led to a shortage of fishing
boat crew, with the result that young boys are being pulled out of school
to work on the boats. Issues related to quality are being seen–boats are
often not seaworthy, as organizations seem to compromise on quality in
an effort to increase numbers. There are also issues relating to the lack
of suitability of boats to local preferences and sea conditions. The fish-
eries rehabilitation policy also has not addressed deeper issues associ-
ated with depleting fishery resources, sea safety (such as search and
rescue operations for stranded fish workers) and disaster preparedness
(for instance, by means of insurance coverage).
Accurate damage estimation has been problematic1 as a large propor-
tion of the craft were unregistered and without any records. To circum-
vent difficulties created by the lack of existing data, the rehabilitation
process has been largely routed through the traditional fish worker
panchayats (these are community institutions different from the elected
panchayats) that govern these communities. While these have greatly
facilitated identification of beneficiaries and implementation of rehabil-
itation packages, they are not egalitarian in several respects. Women do
not have a place in these traditional panchayats, and so are often left out
during rehabilitation processes. While the panchayat does support them
for their basic needs, this support is usually at the subsistence level.
With respect to agriculture, it is widely believed that the official esti-
mates of affected lands are far less than the actual figures. The compen-
sation for crop damage is inadequate, and the efficacy of the desalina-
tion packages provided by the government is still under question (civil
society organizations are exploring organic techniques for restoration
of agricultural lands, particularly in the Nagapattinam district). Agricul-
tural laborers, mostly Dalits, have been subsumed in the larger dis-
course on agricultural land, with typically only landowners being con-
sidered as tsunami affected. While in some areas relief packages did
reach laborers, nothing much has been done for them in terms of liveli-
hood rehabilitation.
The situation of people engaged in petty trades, service provision, al-
lied services such as fish curing, vending, etc., and working in saltpan
lands is similar. Relief packages were announced for these groups, but lit-
tle is available by means of livelihood rehabilitation, as it is believed that
these dependent livelihoods would pick up as the fishing economy re-
vived. It is also being seen that claiming compensation for loss of liveli-
hood, particularly when one is a part of the unorganized sector, is very
problematic because of issues related to evidence and proof.2 Getting
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losses certified by the administration, or getting people to vouch for them
during enquiries has been a difficult proposition3 for itinerant vendors
and service providers. Some civil society organizations have been in-
volved in providing legal aid services to those who have not received
their entitlements. Alternative livelihood programs are also being ex-
plored.
What cuts across the entire experience of livelihood rehabilitation is
that both the government and civil society organizations have largely
adopted property-centric relief and rehabilitation policies, with the re-
sult that livelihood rehabilitation packages predominantly reach only
people who possess assets such as boats, land, shops, etc. Several groups that
contribute to the coastal economy by providing their labor and skills
have all found themselves sidelined and disregarded.
An Overview of Accountability and Transparency
in Tsunami Response
The working of the various agencies involved in the relief and reha-
bilitation process has not been free of concerns related to transparency
and accountability.
There is a widely perceived need for civil society organizations to
follow rigorous procedures with regard to financial management and re-
lated transparency, particularly in the context of the large sums of
money that have been received in the wake of the tsunami, a process that
has been made easier by the waiver of the traditional checks otherwise
placed by the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) of 1976.
Civil society organizations have been typically reluctant to share infor-
mation on resources received and utilized with other civil society actors,
often saying that they are accountable to only the government.
People also voice concerns relating to issues such as poor quality and
slow pace of work, non-participatory approaches and a general unwill-
ingness to share information. The visibility4 as well as the financial re-
sources that tsunami related work seems to have, leads to intense com-
petition to “acquire” villages and spend massive budgets, often in a
non-consultative and uncoordinated manner (Anand, 2005). It is also
troubling that despite many claims by NGOs that their focus of work and
advocacy is on vulnerable groups, issues like the conditions of agricul-
tural laborers, and lacunae in old age pension schemes have not received
adequate attention in policy.
While the participation of affected people is widely upheld as a prin-
ciple, in practice, however, it is not always realized due to the nature of
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institutional arrangements around financial reporting and obligations.
One reason cited by NGOs as a hindrance in giving full play to partici-
patory processes was the necessity to achieve targets and meet project
deadlines. It also appears that lack of mutual familiarity and knowledge
of local conditions makes it all the more difficult to foster mutual trust,
an essential condition for effective participation. Many organizations
have tried to circumvent this problem by hiring locals, ideally people
from the affected community itself, as their outreach workers.
The nature of institutional arrangements governing donor-partner rela-
tionships also affects relevance (meaning the extent to which the program
meets people’s felt needs) and effectiveness of programs. Contractual obli-
gations, including sanctioned budget lines and conditions regarding pro-
gram type and implementation, have had significant bearing on the level of
flexibility in program administration. It is commonly seen that there is min-
imal scope to make alterations in the program, or make mid-course correc-
tions because of various conditions imposed by donor agencies.
Relevance of programs is also affected by the enthusiasm of many or-
ganizations to apply new knowledge without researching it carefully,
and to bring about social change in the community.5 Further, one finds
that many of the agencies engaged in post-tsunami relief and rehabilita-
tion do not have the experience, expertise or knowledge of the coastal
economy, social systems and structures required to design and imple-
ment meaningful programs. When such organizations “influence” their
local partners to take up “specific” areas of work or modes of imple-
mentation, intervention often becomes inappropriate to local condi-
tions.
What emerges from these experiences is the value of different types
of civil society organizations confining themselves to clearly defined
roles. There seems considerable merit in the argument that donor agen-
cies that are not familiar with local conditions should not take on the
role of a direct implementing agency. Ideally, while a development sup-
port agency brings in the financial resources, a local development orga-
nization must work to facilitate the rehabilitation process in partnership
with the community.
With respect to the State, the administration seems to have earned a
fairly clean chit in terms of accountability and transparency in its work-
ing. While this could be attributed to the fact that the government has,
for the most part, stayed away from direct, beneficiary oriented imple-
mentation of rehabilitation, it is also true that several mechanisms have
been set up to ensure a certain level of transparency in the disaster re-
sponse. For one, the government has taken a deliberate decision to part-
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ner with civil society organizations in the rehabilitation process, and
this, along with several other monitoring measures, has gone a long way
in minimizing corruption in the delivery of aid.
With respect to financial transparency, the government has exhibited
a great deal of willingness to share information. However, some ambi-
guity exists in civil society regarding the exact quantum and utilization
of funds received from various sources such as the World Bank, Asian
Development Bank, and the Central Government. The government, be-
ing obliged to set the highest standards of transparency and accountabil-
ity, should take immediate steps to clear this ambiguity, by perhaps
issuing a White Paper on this question.
VULNERABILITIES AND EXCLUSION
The ongoing process of relief and rehabilitation has seen the exclu-
sion of several groups of people because of a complex matrix of reasons
relating to factors as diverse as inherent vulnerabilities and active dis-
crimination, as well as systemic deficiencies.
The special needs of vulnerable groups such as women, children, the
disabled, and the aged were not considered in the relief phase. For in-
stance, the relief packages distributed did not contain even children’s
clothing. Older people found it difficult to collect relief packages in
camps as they were pushed around. A study conducted by HelpAge In-
ternational during the relief phase reveals that a main reason underlying
the invisibility of older people is the absence of data disaggregated by
age (HelpAge International, 2005). Women faced several problems,
including those related to lack of privacy and appropriate sanitation fa-
cilities.
The Tamil Nadu government has, however, done well to respond to
civil society’s concerns about child trafficking in the guise of adoption
after disasters, and has directed that all affected children are to remain in
their home districts, and that all orphans without caretakers are to be
housed only in government orphanages.
With regard to the elderly, the government’s old age pension scheme,
that was extended with immediate effect to all eligible tsunami affected
people who were not already covered, is severely lacking. Under this
scheme only people above the age of 60 who do not have a son above
the age of 18 years are eligible for pension. The scheme completely ig-
nores the fact that many elderly, destitute people are estranged from
their families and sons, and so are as helpless and vulnerable as those
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without sons. Further, the fact that the policy mentions sons rather than
daughters is contrary to the principle of gender justice that should be the
cornerstone of an equitable rehabilitation process. The disabled receive
no mention in the rehabilitation policy, other than directions issued
ordering the distribution of aid devices.
There are reports of Dalits facing discrimination during the relief
phase, and being denied even food aid on the grounds that there were no
deaths among them (Alternative Law Forum, 2005). In the rehabilita-
tion phase, the prospect of relocation is leading to caste related con-
flicts. With certain fish worker communities opting for relocation,
identifying suitable sites becomes problematic when Dalit communities
are found between the new site and the sea, as traditionally Dalit settle-
ments are always leeward of fishing villages.
Women’s work has not been recognized by rehabilitation pro-
grams (Oxfam, 2005). Livelihood restoration measures have focused
on replacement of assets, thus excluding women who rarely possess
assets in their names. Often the disbursement of relief and rehabilita-
tion packages is controlled by fish worker traditional panchayats
that are dominated by men, leading to further exclusion of women.
Even when women do get compensation and relief packages, other
family members typically take over the resources that come in
(Manecksha, 2005). It must be noted here, however, that the govern-
ment has taken several measures to incorporate women’s concerns in
the rehabilitation policies–for instance, all houses are to be regis-
tered in the names of both the husband and wife; any transfer of the
wife’s share to the husband is void.
The case of the Irulas, a semi-nomadic adivasi (tribal) community,
reveals with a great deal of clarity an important factor influencing ex-
clusion in disaster response. The Irulas (several members of which are
engaged in backwater/catamaran fishing near the shore, or work as ca-
sual labor on fishing boats) as a group were, and continue to be, over-
looked in the relief and rehabilitation processes.
As a community, the Irulas have long been invisible given their no-
madic habits, and scattered, sparsely populated settlements. They rarely
possess proofs of identity such as ration cards (an official document is-
sued by the Government that entitles holders to subsidized food from the
Public Distribution System), voter’s identification cards, or caste/com-
munity identity certificates (entitling members of marginalized groups to
benefits of affirmative action). Many of the households do not even ap-
pear in the Census as the Irula settlements are usually located far from the
main roads, and people are usually not available at home during the day.
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After the tsunami, Irulas whose houses were affected had nothing to
show–they lived in huts that were completely washed away, leaving no
signs of the destruction that had been wreaked. Their settlements were
dispersed, so identification of the affected and distribution of relief be-
came huge tasks. A variety of evidence was required to get compensa-
tion–a house on patta (a title deed) land, recognition of the village by a
panchayat (Irulas live in dispersed, isolated clusters, unrecognized by
the VAO or a panchayat) and other government identification cards–
none of which was available with them. The Irulas are also, by nature, a
reserved community, and are reluctant to even speak about the losses
they have suffered in the tsunami to outsiders. In short, they lack the
ability to sell themselves, and this when contrasted with the highly orga-
nized and articulate fish worker community, puts the Irulas even more
at a disadvantage. It has also been noticed that even civil society organi-
zations are not very eager to support Irula rehabilitation possibly be-
cause their settlements are scattered and sparsely populated. It is easier
to get numbers (in terms of families and people), identify beneficiaries,
distribute relief and rehabilitation packages, and raise resources in the
densely packed fish worker settlements.
Understanding Exclusion: The Politics of Information
and Definition
The Tamil Nadu experience shows that exclusion in post-disaster sit-
uations is linked to an interaction of factors such as inherent vulnerabili-
ties, data integrity, and definition of “affected.”
In the first days after the tsunami, no relief reached a particular Hindu
village in the predominantly Christian coastline of Kanyakumari, as the
district administration depended on the Church for information about af-
fected settlements (the Catholic Church is a very well-established institu-
tion in this area, and played a crucial role in coordinating relief and
rehabilitation processes). This village did not figure in Church records as
the Church maintained detailed records only of the Christian settlements.
As the administration did not possess readily accessible, accurate geo-de-
mographic data, it relied, and continues to rely, on the Church for records,
thereby creating a situation in which there are bound to be exclusions.
The neglect of the Irula community can also be attributed to similar rea-
sons–only a hazy, distorted picture of these people exists with the govern-
ment, and hence its inability to proactively identify them as “affected”
and address their concerns.
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As can be seen from these instances, and from the situation on the
ground, the underlying issue emerges to be one of data integrity. De-
tailed and accurate demographic (inclusive of socioeconomic and geo-
graphic information) data and other relevant records are not available
with the government, and where available, are often not accurate.
This deficit in data integrity is exacerbated by a skewed understanding
of the term “affected” that is based on the premise that only settlements
that were damaged by water, and that only people who had lost lives and
property, were “affected.” This visibility-influenced definition has in turn
directed the manner in which compensation, relief and rehabilitation pro-
cesses were and continue to be designed and implemented–there is stress
on provision of evidence that one has lost assets. Added to this is the
flawed conceptualization of the “coastal community” as a homogeneous
whole (namely fish workers), rather than a vibrant system of inherently
different groups, held together by geo-economic links.
While corrective measures have been taken to widen the scope of the
definition of “affected,” they have not been completely effective in
reaching excluded groups, as most systems and mechanisms governing
the relief and rehabilitation process are still based on the original under-
standing of affected, as well as on the initial impact assessments and
registrations of affected people.
TSUNAMI RESPONSE IN TAMIL NADU:
CONSOLIDATING THE EXPERIENCES
It is clear from the Tamil Nadu experience that a responsive and
proactive government, that devolves powers and responsibilities to the
administration, is a necessary condition for effective disaster response.
Further, institutional autonomy, and decision-making free of political
interference, are crucial in fostering people-sensitive and effective
relief and rehabilitation.
It also appears that a lot depends on the perspective, approach and ca-
pacity of individual officers in key positions; however, this overreliance
on the ability of the individual occupying a particular office is not with-
out its dangers. It is necessary to examine means of extrapolating the
learnings of such officers to an institutional level in order to create a
common skills and knowledge base.
While an efficient and non-corrupt administration is a necessary con-
dition for effective disaster response, particularly in the relief phase, a
much deeper engagement is needed with local elected institutions–the
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elected panchayats–to ensure equitable and inclusive rehabilitation,
and to counter several of the problems seen commonly. The 73rd Con-
stitutional Amendment vests with the village panchayat the obligatory
function of disaster management and preparedness; panchayats possess
the potential to implement the rehabilitation process at the grassroots
level, and are well-placed to foster community participation. They can
also play a key role in creating detailed demographic databases, and are
perhaps the institutions best suited to monitor reconstruction, as well as
incorporate long-term development goals in the rehabilitation agenda.
However, in practice, one finds that in most post-disaster situations,
as in the case of the tsunami, elected panchayats (as different from tra-
ditional panchayats) are not given the space and resources to facilitate
the reconstruction process. Despite these obstacles, in Tamil Nadu there
is newly emerging evidence (Parasuraman, 2006) that in places where
panchayats have been active, the recovery process has progressed much
faster and in a far more accountable manner. It is therefore vital that the
involvement of these local bodies in disaster response is institutional-
ized in practice, and that they are equipped with the necessary capabili-
ties and resources.
This study of tsunami response in Tamil Nadu also shows that a vi-
brant interface and partnership between the State and civil society is criti-
cal to ensure that people’s concerns are addressed by both policy and
practice, as well as to minimize corruption. This synergy needs to be fos-
tered by both the State and civil society proactively. Also important is the
need for effective communication channels, coordination, dialogue and
information among and within civil society organizations to avoid dupli-
cation, wastage of resources and competition, and to optimize individual
efforts.
With regard to the several instances of poor quality of intervention, it
is inexcusable that such issues continue to plague disaster response de-
spite the widespread knowledge and awareness that exists about stan-
dards in humanitarian aid, for instance, the Sphere Standards. What is
patent, however, is that, given that post-disaster situations are character-
ized by flux, a great deal of flexibility in terms of rehabilitation policy,
the nature of interventions, budgets and timelines, and even program
objectives, is required to allow for the adapting of response interven-
tions to address ground level realities as well as the true needs of people.
Further, there is a strong case for civil society organizations to put in
a lot more effort in fostering transparency in their interventions. At the
end of the day, all funding they receive and all programs they administer
are in real terms meant for the people. Therefore, they should be first in
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line to share with others all details of their functioning, and in fact
should welcome the involvement of the affected community in monitor-
ing their interventions and programs.
Moving on to the questions of exclusion, what counts is the capacity
of the system to deal with this exclusion, and for this, accurate and reli-
able disaggregated data on various lines is crucial, as is the willingness
and capacity to alter policy to suit changing needs. Post-tsunami, it is
strikingly clear that there is a pressing need for detailed and inclusive
geo-demographic and socioeconomic data collection, and vulnerability
mapping as a resource base for disaster preparedness. The importance
of avoiding rigid and unalterable definitions of “affected” is also evi-
denced by this experience.
The importance of disaster preparedness has never been so clearly
brought out as in the case of the tsunami. Preparedness is needed at vari-
ous levels; for one, there needs to be preparedness to respond, in terms
of institutional structures and systems, personnel as well as material re-
sources. Community preparedness is another crucial aspect. The first
few hours after the tsunami showed that it was the community itself that
was the first to respond, as in the case of all disasters. Communities
need to be prepared so that not only are the impacts of disasters miti-
gated, but also so that they are knowledgeable about how to respond.
Preparedness also includes addressing vulnerabilities: development of
capabilities, reducing poverty, access to insurance, early warning sys-
tems, etc., all form a part of this. And at the broadest level, the need for a
holistic and integrated policy on disasters that covers all aspects of
prevention, preparedness, mitigation and response cannot be ignored.
NOTES
1. The process of delivering relief and rehabilitation in a manner in which resources
are spent judiciously, while ensuring that all affected people get their entitlements has
posed quite a challenge to the government. Given the absence of reliable population
data and records, the primary difficulty lay in identifying beneficiaries and verifying
whether their losses were genuine. The government has relied heavily on community-
based institutions to get data on damages and affected people.
2. In the agricultural sector, compensation for loss of livestock is sanctioned only if
the claimant has photographic evidence of the death of the animal–in the wake of the
tsunami, most bodies were washed away, and those that remained were given a hasty
burial to prevent disease outbreaks, making it next to impossible to produce such proof.
3. A case in point is the plight of Narikurava (gypsy) vendors in the tourist town of
Mahabalipuram near Chennai city. The tsunami waters washed away their wares–
artifacts and costume jewellery. But they have been unable to access compensation as
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there is no one to vouch for their losses–not only do they keep moving, they are also
viewed with distrust and contempt by the mainstream.
4. It was pointed out by many that NGOs prefer to go to Nagapattinam, Cuddalore
and Kanyakumari as they receive media attention. In contrast, in areas like Ram-
anathapuram or Vizhupuram, Thiruvallur, and Kanchipuram, one finds very few
NGOs, and also only local NGOs that do not have much capacity to raise or spend
money.
5. A case in point is the virtual flood of surveys and administration of psychosocial
interventions that followed the tsunami. While many of the psychosocial care interven-
tions were sensitively designed, there were others that were not so. Several months
later, affected people still recount the trauma of having to repeat the same stories, draw
the same pictures and listen to strangers asking one to “cry and get it out,” in many
cases, several times over with different agencies and organisations. Another instance is
that of the oversupply of boats caused by the desire to foster equity that in turn has led
to young boys being removed from school to work as crew.
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